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Abstract 
The current chapter reviews the findings of an ongoing research program suggesting that changes 
in attitudes can be limited to the context in which counterattitudinal information was learned. 
The reviewed findings indicate that, although counterattitudinal information may effectively 
influence evaluations in the context in which this information was learned, previously formed 
attitudes may continue to influence evaluations in any other context. According to the 
representational theory of contextualized attitude change, such patterns of contextual renewal 
occur because exposure to expectancy-violating information enhances attention to context, which 
leads to an integration of the context into the representation of expectancy-violating 
counterattitudinal information. The chapter reviews research that (a) tested novel predictions 
derived from the representational theory of contextualized attitude change, (b) explored the 
nature of contextualized representations, and (c) investigated the boundary conditions of 
contextualized attitude change. Theoretical challenges, future directions, and implications for 
basic and applied research are discussed. 
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People have a natural predisposition to appraise objects as “good” or “bad”. This 
propensity is the hallmark of attitudes, which can be defined as “a psychological tendency that is 
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). Attitudes have been shown to influence behavior by shaping the construal 
of the current situation, eliciting spontaneous approach-avoidance tendencies, and guiding the 
formation of deliberate action plans (Fazio, 1990; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Expanding on the 
ubiquitous effects of attitudes on behavior, a great deal of research has sought to identify the 
determinants of attitude change. The basic idea underlying this research is that, when attitudes 
change, the behaviors that are known to be influenced by attitudes will change accordingly 
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This idea has become a central 
tenet in various applied areas, including research on the effects of commercial advertisements, 
health communication, and interventions to reduce intergroup prejudice (Perloff, 2003; Stiff & 
Mongeau, 2003).   
An important question in research on attitude change concerns the temporal stability of 
observed changes in evaluations. Whereas some factors tend to produce changes that remain 
temporally stable, others lead to ephemeral shifts in evaluations that dissipate over time (e.g., 
Chaiken, 1980; Petty, 1977). Although temporal stability has been a central issue in social 
psychological theories of attitude change (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), hardly any attention has 
been devoted to the question of whether observed changes in evaluations generalize across 
contexts. The current chapter reviews the findings of an ongoing research program, suggesting 
that changes in evaluations can be limited to the context in which counterattitudinal information 
was learned. That is, although counterattitudinal information may influence evaluations of an 
object within the context in which this information was learned, previously formed attitudes 
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toward the object can continue to influence evaluations in any other context. For example, if 
Sally forms an initial positive impression of her new colleague Harry at work and later sees him 
being rude to another person at the gym, the new negative information about Harry may 
influence Sally’s evaluative response to Harry only when she encounters him within the context 
of the gym. In contrast, Sally’s evaluative response to Harry may continue to reflect the initial 
positive impression when she encounters him at work (original learning context) or at a 
bookstore where she has not encountered him before (completely novel context). Expanding on a 
review of evidence for this idea, we describe the core assumptions of a representational theory 
that specifies the mental processes and representations underlying contextualized attitude 
change. Using this theory as a framework, we review research that (a) tested novel predictions 
derived from the theory, (b) explored the nature of contextualized representations, and (c) 
investigated potential boundary conditions of contextualized attitude change. In the final 
sections, we discuss theoretical challenges, future directions, and implications for basic and 
applied research.  
The Representational Theory of Contextualized Attitude Change 
The two most prominent paradigms to study the formation and change of attitudes are the 
persuasion paradigm (see Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the evaluative 
conditioning (EC) paradigm (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). The persuasion 
paradigm focuses on attitudinal effects of verbal arguments and characteristics of the message 
source (e.g., expertise, likeability). The EC paradigm investigates attitudinal effects of observed 
co-occurrences of a conditioned stimulus (CS) with a positive or negative unconditioned 
stimulus (US). In a broad sense, both paradigms involve the learning of new evaluative 
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information. To the extent that this information conflicts with a previously formed attitude, this 
information can be described as counterattitudinal.  
The basic notion of contextualized attitude change is that mental representations of 
counterattitudinal information about an object often become bound to the context in which this 
information was learned. As a result, activation of the counterattitudinal information is limited to 
that context, such that previously formed attitudes toward the object continue to determine 
evaluations of the object in any other context. According to the representational theory of 
contextualized attitude change (Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer, 2010), a central 
determinant of such effects is the violation of attitude-related expectancies during the learning of 
counterattitudinal information. Although exposure to counterattitudinal information does not 
always produce an expectancy-violation (e.g., when a political opponent argues for a position 
that conflicts with one’s political views), it can lead to a violation of expectancies when a 
previously formed attitude gives rise to the expectation of positive or negative information about 
an object and this expectation is violated by information of the opposite valence (e.g., when a 
positively evaluated person engages in negative behavior, or vice versa).  
Drawing on previous research on the effects of expectancy-violation (for a review, see 
Roese & Sherman, 2007), the representational theory of contextualized attitude change further 
assumes that exposure to expectancy-violating information enhances attention to the momentary 
context (see Rosas & Callejas-Aguilera, 2007). As a result, incidental context cues become 
integrated into the representation of the newly acquired counterattitudinal information. In line 
with earlier theories (e.g., Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000), the theory further assumes that counterattitudinal information does not erase previously 
formed attitudes from memory. Instead, the newly formed contextualized representation is 
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simply added to the existing memory structures. Thus, to the extent that attention to context is 
typically low during the learning of initial attitudinal information (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; 
Jones, 1991), the mental representation of the object can be said to acquire a “dual” nature, in 
that it comprises (a) a context-free representation of initially acquired attitudinal information 
about the object, and (b) a contextualized representation of the subsequently acquired 
counterattitudinal information about the object.  
Contextual Renewal  
Drawing on the notion of pattern matching in memory retrieval (Smith, 1996), the 
proposed “dual” representation can lead to different evaluations of the object depending on the 
context in which it is encountered (see Table 1). First, if positive or negative information about 
an object is learned in an initial Context A, and this information is subsequently challenged by 
evaluatively incongruent information in another Context B, encountering the object in Context A 
should activate the initially formed context-free representation. As a result, evaluative responses 
to the object in Context A reflect the valence of the initial attitudinal information. Adopting 
terminology from the animal learning literature, this outcome can be described as a case of ABA 
renewal (Bouton, 2004), in that an initial response that was acquired in Context A reemerges in 
the original learning Context A after a different response was learned in a different Context B 
(e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Bouton & Peck, 1989).  
Second, if positive or negative information about an object is learned in an initial Context 
A, and this information is subsequently challenged by evaluatively incongruent information in 
another Context B, encountering the object in a novel Context C should also activate the initially 
formed context-free representation. As a result, evaluative responses to the object in Context C 
should reflect the valence of the initial attitudinal information. This outcome can be described as 
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a case of ABC renewal (Bouton, 2004), in that an initial response that was acquired in Context A 
reemerges in a novel Context C after a different response was learned in Context B (e.g., Bouton 
& Bolles, 1979; Bouton & Brooks, 1993).  
Third, if positive or negative information about an object is learned in an initial Context 
A, and this information is subsequently challenged by evaluatively incongruent information in a 
second Context B, encountering the object in Context B should activate the contextualized 
representation, leading to an evaluative response that reflects the valence of the 
counterattitudinal information learned in Context B. Thus, in combination with the above cases 
of ABA and ABC renewal, the presence versus absence of Context B moderates the evaluative 
response that is elicited by the object. If Context B is present, the object will elicit an evaluative 
response that reflects the valence of the subsequently acquired counterattitudinal information. In 
contrast, if Context B is absent, the object will elicit an evaluative response that reflects the 
valence of the initially acquired attitudinal information.  
To illustrate these patterns, imagine that a person formed a favorable first impression of a 
new colleague at work and this impression was later challenged by negative behavior of that 
person at the gym. In this case, the initial positive information would be stored in a context-free 
representation, whereas the subsequent negative information would be stored in a contextualized 
representation. As a result, evaluative responses to the new colleague should be negative only in 
contexts that are similar to the gym. In contrast, the initial positive information should influence 
evaluative responses in any other context, including the work context in which the initial 
impression had been formed and any other context in which the new colleague had not been 
encountered before (e.g., at a bookstore).  
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In line with this idea, Rydell and Gawronski (2009) provided the first evidence for 
contextualized changes in social attitudes. In their research, participants were first presented with 
either positive or negative information about a target person against a meaningless, colored 
background (e.g., a yellow screen). In a second block of the learning task, participants were 
presented with new information about the target person that was evaluatively opposite to the 
information provided in the first block, and this information was presented against a different 
colored background (e.g., a blue screen). After each of the two learning blocks, spontaneous 
evaluative responses to the target person were assessed with an affective priming task (Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) in which the target person was presented against either: (a) 
the background of the first learning block (Context A), (b) the background of the second learning 
block (Context B), or (c) a novel background that was not part of the learning task (Context C). 
Results showed that evaluations of the target person changed in response to the counterattitudinal 
information only when the target was presented against the background of the second learning 
block (see Figure 1). Evaluations of the target person continued to reflect the valence of the 
initial attitudinal information when the target was presented against the background of the first 
learning block (ABA renewal) or a novel background that was not part of the learning task (ABC 
renewal).  
To assess the reliability of contextualized change effects in Rydell and Gawronski’s 
(2009) impression formation paradigm, Gawronski, Hu, Rydell, Vervliet, and De Houwer (2015) 
conducted a meta-analysis that included all studies from the authors’ labs regardless of whether 
they did or did not replicate the original pattern of results. In their meta-analysis, ABA renewal 
was conceptualized as the difference in the evaluation of a given target in Context A and Context 
B after the learning of evaluatively incongruent information about the target in Contexts A and 
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B; ABC renewal was conceptualized as the difference in the evaluation of a given target in 
Context C and Context B after the learning of evaluatively incongruent information about the 
target in Contexts A and B. In both cases, renewal effects were coded such that higher scores 
reflect a stronger influence of the initial attitudinal information compared to the subsequent 
counterattitudinal information in Context A versus Context B (ABA renewal) and Context C 
versus Context B (ABC renewal), respectively. Although average effect sizes were relatively 
small with d = .249 for ABA renewal (30 studies, N = 3,142) and d = .174 for ABC renewal (27 
studies, N = 2,930), both effect sizes were significantly different from zero. Together, these 
results support the hypothesis that effects of counterattitudinal information can be limited to the 
context in which this information was learned, such that initially formed attitudes continue to 
shape evaluations in any other context. 
Attention to Context 
A central assumption of the representational theory is that exposure to expectancy-
violating information enhances attention to context (e.g., enhanced attention to context when an 
initial positive impression of a new colleague is challenged by negative behavior), which leads to 
an integration of the context into the representation of the expectancy-violating information (see 
also Bouton, 2010; Pearce, George, & Redhead, 1998; Rosas & Callejas-Aguilera, 2007). Thus, 
to the extent that attention to context is typically low during the learning of initial attitudinal 
information (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1991), initial attitudinal information should be 
stored in context-free representations, whereas counterattitudinal information should be stored in 
contextualized representations.  
Evidence for these assumptions comes from a study by Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, and De 
Houwer (2014). To investigate attention to context during the learning of attitude-congruent and 
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attitude-incongruent information, participants were presented with 30 behavioral statements 
about a target individual that were displayed one-by-one against different background colors. 
The initial 20 statements suggested either a positive or a negative personality; the 21st statement 
was used as a target statement and described a behavior that was either congruent or incongruent 
with the valence of the initial 20 statements. The target statement was followed by nine distracter 
statements that matched the valence of the initial 20 statements. Participants’ task was to form an 
impression of the target individual. After the impression formation task, participants completed a 
surprise recognition test, in which they had to identify the background color against which the 
target statement was presented during the impression formation task. Results showed that 
recognition memory for the background color of the target statement was at chance level when 
the target statement was evaluatively congruent with the initial impression of the target. 
However, recognition memory was substantially higher, and significantly different from chance 
level, when the target statement was evaluatively incongruent with the initial impression (see 
Figure 2). These results support the hypothesis that exposure to counterattitudinal information 
enhances attention to momentarily available context cues, which in turn leads to an integration of 
these cues into the representation of the counterattitudinal information. 
Further evidence for the hypothesized role of attentional processes comes from a series of 
studies by Gawronski et al. (2010) that aimed to influence participants’ attention to context cues 
during the learning of either (a) initial attitudinal information or (b) subsequent counterattitudinal 
information. In the scenarios described above, attention to context cues was assumed to be low 
during the learning of initial attitudinal information and enhanced by exposure to subsequent 
counterattitudinal information. As a result, context cues should be included in the representation 
of counterattitudinal information but not in the representation of initial attitudinal information. If, 
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on the other hand, attention to context cues is high for some reason during the learning of both 
initial attitudinal and subsequent counterattitudinal information, then the two pieces of 
information should be stored in two contextualized representations: one including the initial 
attitudinal information and the initial Context A, and the other one including the 
counterattitudinal information and the subsequent Context B. In such cases, encountering the 
object in a novel Context C should activate the two representations to the same extent, thereby 
producing an averaging effect of the two kinds of information rather than a renewal effect. In 
other words, evaluations of the object in a novel Context C should be neutral (or ambivalent) 
instead of reflecting the valence of the initially acquired attitudinal information. Thus, a central 
prediction of the representational theory is that ABC renewal should be reduced if attention to 
context is enhanced during the learning of initial attitudinal information about an object.  
Importantly, enhanced attention to context during the learning of initial attitudinal 
information should attenuate only ABC renewal, but not ABA renewal. In fact, ABA renewal 
should remain perfectly intact because evaluative responses in Context A should be driven by the 
contextualized representation of the initial attitudinal information. The same is true for 
evaluative responses in Context B. Because evaluative responses in Context B are driven by the 
contextualized representation of the subsequent counterattitudinal information, enhanced 
attention to context during the learning of initial attitudinal information should leave evaluative 
responses in Context B unaffected. That is, evaluations of the object in Context B should reflect 
the valence of counterattitudinal information that was learned in this context.  
These predictions have been confirmed in a study by Gawronski et al. (2010, Experiment 
1) that combined Rydell and Gawronski’s (2009) impression formation paradigm with a priming 
manipulation designed to increase versus decrease attention to the background color during the 
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first block of the impression formation task. Toward this end, participants first completed a 
context priming task that involved the presentation of evaluative information about another 
individual (named Jim) before they learned about the target individual (named Bob). The 
presented information about Jim included both positive and negative information, which was 
randomly interspersed across trials. The information about Jim was presented against two 
background colors (i.e., brown, green). For half of the participants, there was a perfect 
contingency between background color and valence of information about Jim (e.g., positive-
green; negative-brown). For the remaining half, there was no contingency between background 
color and valence. The first case was assumed to enhance attention to background color, because 
it was predictive of the valence of the information about Jim. The second case was assumed to 
reduce attention to background color, because background color was inconsequential in this case. 
Following the context priming task, participants completed the impression formation task by 
Rydell and Gawronski (2009), using blocked presentations of positive and negative information 
about the target individual Bob against two background colors that were different from the ones 
in the context priming task (i.e., yellow, blue).  
Consistent with the predictions of the representational theory, ABC renewal was 
significantly reduced under conditions that aimed to enhance attention to context during the 
learning of initial attitudinal information about the target individual Bob; ABA renewal was 
unaffected by the attention priming manipulation (see Figure 3). Specifically, evaluative 
responses toward the target individual Bob were unaffected by the context priming manipulation 
when he was encountered against the background of the first learning block (Context A) or the 
second learning block (Context B). In either of these cases, evaluative responses toward Bob 
reflected the valence of the information learned in the respective context. In contrast, when the 
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target individual Bob was encountered against a novel background that was not part of the 
impression formation task (Context C), evaluative responses toward Bob reflected the valence of 
the initial attitudinal information when attention to context was primed to be low. When attention 
to context was primed to be high, evaluative responses were relatively neutral overall, 
presumably reflecting a mixture of the initial attitudinal and subsequent counterattitudinal 
information. 
Another implication of the representational theory is that both ABA and ABC renewal 
should be attenuated when attention to context cues is reduced during the encoding of 
counterattitudinal information. In such cases, counterattitudinal information should be integrated 
into the initial, context-free representation, which should eliminate context effects altogether. 
That is, evaluative responses should reflect all of the available information about the object 
regardless of whether it is encountered in the initial Context A, the subsequent Context B, or a 
novel Context C. In other words, reduced attention to context during the encoding of 
counterattitudinal information should eliminate both ABA and ABC renewal, and thus the full 
pattern of contextualized attitude change.  
Gawronski et al. (2010, Experiment 3) confirmed these predictions in a study that aimed 
to manipulate attention to context cues during the encoding of counterattitudinal information by 
presenting this information against either a single background color or multiple different 
background colors. The basic idea underlying this manipulation was that counterattitudinal 
information in multiple different contexts signals that the newly acquired information generalizes 
across contexts, which should reduce participants’ attention to context. Consistent with these 
assumptions, Gawronski et al. found evidence for ABA and ABC renewal when 
counterattitudinal information was presented against a single background. In contrast, when 
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counterattitudinal information was presented against multiple different backgrounds, participants 
showed neutral evaluations regardless of whether the target was presented in the initial Context 
A, the subsequent Context B, or a novel Context C (see Figure 4).  
Mere Attention or Causal Attribution? 
The evidence reviewed thus far suggests at least two possible ways by which attentional 
processes may promote the formation of contextualized representations. First, one could argue 
that context cues are integrated into the representation of counterattitudinal information to the 
extent that these cues systematically covary with different kinds of information. For example, if 
Sally forms an initial positive impression of her new colleague Harry at work and later sees him 
being rude to another person at the gym, the gym context may be integrated into Sally’s 
representation of Harry’s negative behavior to the extent that Harry’s behavior differs depending 
on whether he is in gym or somewhere else. This hypothesis resonates with covariation-based 
theories of causal attribution, suggesting that unexpected behaviors are attributed to factors that 
tend to covary with these behaviors (e.g., Försterling, 1989; Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Kelley, 
1973). Second, it is possible that enhanced attention to context is sufficient for an integration of 
the context in a contextualized representation regardless whether the context does or does not 
covary with the unexpected expected behavior. This scenario resembles attentional 
interpretations of illusory correlation effects (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Sherman, 
Kruschke, Sherman, Percy, Petrocelli, & Conrey, 2009), which suggest that attention to two co-
occurring stimuli (e.g., Paul’s negative behavior and the plane context) can create a link between 
these stimuli in memory even if they lack any objective contingency.  
An important difference between the two accounts is that, in the former case, the context 
should be integrated into the representation of counterattitudinal information only when this 
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context differs from the context that was present during the learning of the initial attitudinal 
information (i.e., when context systematically covaries with valence). In the latter case, 
counterattitudinal information may become contextualized even when there is no difference in 
the context (i.e., even when context does not systematically covary with valence). Although the 
former hypothesis can account for the reviewed patterns of ABA and ABC renewal, it is unable 
to explain cases of AAB renewal (see Bouton & Ricker, 1994; Tamai & Nakajima, 2000). In 
AAB renewal, both initial attitudinal information and subsequent counterattitudinal information 
are learned in the same Context A, and counterattitudinal information effectively influences 
evaluations in that context. However, initial attitudinal information continues to influence 
evaluations in any other Context B (see Table 1). For example, if a person formed a favorable 
first impression of a new colleague at work and this impression was later challenged by negative 
behavior of that person in the same work context, evaluative responses to the new colleague 
should be negative only in contexts that are similar to the work context. In contrast, evaluative 
responses in any other context should reflect the initial positive impression of the new colleague.  
An important aspect of AAB renewal is that there is no meaningful relation between 
context and valence, which implies that the context during the learning of counterattitudinal 
information does not systematically covary with the expectancy-violating behavior. Thus, 
although causal attributions might contribute to renewal effects when the contexts of initial 
attitudinal and subsequent counterattitudinal information differ, such attributions do not seem 
necessary to produce contextualized representations. Instead, renewal effects can occur as a 
result of mere attentional processes, such that enhanced attention to context cues may produce 
contextualized representations regardless of whether these cues do or do not systematically 
covary with the unexpected behavior. 
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The representational theory explains AAB renewal with the same set of assumptions that 
have been proposed to explain ABA and ABC renewal. That is, exposure to expectancy-violating 
counterattitudinal information enhances attention to context, which leads to an integration of the 
context into the representation of the counterattitudinal information. To the extent that attention 
to context is low during the learning of initial attitudinal information (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; 
Jones, 1991), the mental representation of the object acquires a “dual” nature, in that it comprises 
(a) a context-free representation of initially acquired attitudinal information, and (b) a 
contextualized representation of the subsequently acquired counterattitudinal information. Thus, 
if positive or negative information about an object is learned in an initial Context A, and this 
information is subsequently challenged by evaluatively incongruent information in the same 
Context A, encountering the object in a novel Context B should activate the initially formed 
context-free representation, eliciting an evaluative response that reflects the valence of the initial 
attitudinal information (AAB renewal). In contrast, if positive or negative information about an 
object is learned in an initial Context A, and this information is subsequently challenged by 
evaluatively incongruent information in the same Context A, encountering the object in Context 
A should activate the subsequently formed contextualized representation, eliciting an evaluative 
response that reflects the valence of the counterattitudinal information.    
Evidence for AAB renewal in the formation and change of social attitudes comes from a 
study by Gawronski et al. (2010, Experiment 4). Using Rydell and Gawronski’s (2009) 
impression formation paradigm, participants were first presented with either positive or negative 
information about a target person against a meaningless, colored background. In a second block, 
participants were presented with information that was evaluatively opposite to the information 
provided in the first block. However, different from Rydell and Gawronski’s (2009) procedure, 
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this information was presented against the same colored background. Evaluative responses to the 
target person were assessed with an affective priming task (Payne et al., 2005) in which the 
target person was presented against either the background of the two blocks of the impression 
formation task (Context A) or a novel background that was not shown during the impression 
formation task (Context B). Results showed that evaluations of the target reflected the valence of 
the newly learned information when the target was presented against the background that was 
displayed during the two blocks of the impression formation task. However, evaluations of the 
target reflected the valence of the information learned initially when the target was presented 
against the novel background (AAB renewal).  
Mental Representation of Contextualized Attitudes 
Constrained versus Direct Activation of Valence 
An important question within the representational theory concerns the mental structure of 
contextualized representations of counterattitudinal information. On the one hand, it is possible 
that context cues are stored in a manner such that they constrain which information is activated 
by the target object. On the other hand, context cues might become directly associated with the 
valence of the counterattitudinal experience, such that they influence evaluative responses over 
and above the information that is available about the target (see Bouton, 2010; Vervliet, 
Baeyens, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2013). To illustrate the difference between the two cases, 
consider the earlier example in which a person formed a favorable first impression of a new 
colleague at work, and this impression is later challenged by the colleague’s negative behavior at 
the gym. In this case, subsequent encounters with the colleague at the gym may elicit a negative 
response because either (a) the gym context facilitates the activation of negative information 
about the colleague and inhibits the activation of positive information about the colleague or (b) 
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the gym context directly elicits a negative response over and above the response that is elicited 
by the available information about the colleague.  
The first interpretation is consistent with the idea that context cues are represented as 
modulatory nodes that determine whether the initial attitudinal information or the subsequent 
counterattitudinal information is activated in response to the attitude object (see Bouton, 1994). 
According to this account, contextualized representations constrain the spread of activation from 
the attitude object to the available evaluative information by virtue of inhibitory links (see Figure 
5, left panel). If the context of the counterattitudinal experience is absent, activation of the object 
node is assumed to spread to the initial attitudinal information, which in turn inhibits the 
activation of the counterattitudinal information. In contrast, if the context of the 
counterattitudinal experience is present, activation of the context node is assumed to inhibit the 
link between the attitude object and the initial attitudinal information, thereby gating the spread 
of activation from the attitude object to the counterattitudinal information, which further inhibits 
the activation of the initial attitudinal information.1 Applied to the above example of a new 
colleague engaging in expectancy-violating negative behavior at the gym, the gym context would 
inhibit the associative link between the colleague and the initial positive information. This 
inhibition would, in turn, promote the spread of activation from the colleague to the 
counterattitudinal negative information, which should further inhibit the activation of the initial 
positive information.  
                                                 
1 Note that a similar idea can be implemented in episodic theories in which each experienced event is stored as a 
specific memory trace rather than in terms of abstract valence (e.g., Hintzman, 1986; Schmidt, De Houwer, & 
Rothermund, 2016). Within episodic models, context functions as a retrieval cue that increases the probability of 
retrieving specific episodic information previously encountered in that context.  
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The second interpretation is consistent with the idea that enhanced attention to context 
cues during the learning of counterattitudinal information may create a direct link between the 
mental representation of these cues and the valence of the counterattitudinal experience (see 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). From this perspective, the observed differences in evaluative 
responses may be driven by additive effects of independent excitatory links between (a) the 
attitude object and the available information about that object and (b) the context of the 
counterattitudinal information and the valence of the counterattitudinal experience (see Figure 5, 
right panel). As a result, evaluative responses should be more likely to reflect the valence of the 
counterattitudinal experience when the attitude object is encountered in the context in which this 
experience was made than when it is encountered in any other context. Applied to the above 
example of a new colleague engaging in expectancy-violating negative behavior at the gym, the 
gym context would directly elicit a negative response in addition to the negative response that 
arises from the spread of activation from the new colleague to the counterattitudinal negative 
information.  
Using Rydell and Gawronski’s (2009) impression formation paradigm, Gawronski et al. 
(2010) tried to differentiate between the two accounts by comparing evaluative responses to the 
target individual to those elicited by other unknown individuals within the same contexts. 
According to the constrained activation account, context effects on evaluative responses should 
be specific to the target individual and not generalize to other unknown individuals within the 
same context. In contrast, the direct activation account implies that context cues should influence 
evaluative responses independent of the target individual, because the context is directly linked 
to the valence of the counterattitudinal experience. Gawronski et al. (2010) found that context 
cues moderated evaluative responses to the target individual, but not evaluative responses to 
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other unknown individuals that were presented in the same contexts. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that context cues constrain the activation of evaluative information 
in response to the target individual (see Figure 5, left panel), and inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that context cues directly activate the valence of the counterattitudinal experience (see Figure 5, 
right panel).  
Although Gawronski et al.’s (2010) findings provide preliminary evidence against the 
direct activation account, a potential objection is that the null effect of context cues in 
influencing evaluative responses to unknown individuals could be due to incidental features of 
the unknown individuals. Specifically, it is possible that incidental facial features of the 
unknown individuals elicited a positive or negative response (e.g., Gawronski & Quinn, 2013), 
which may dilute or override the simultaneous effects of the contexts. Such incidental effects 
could undermine the detection of direct effects of the context cues, thereby leading to a 
premature rejection of the direct activation account. 
More compelling evidence regarding the two accounts was provided by Gawronski et al. 
(2014). A central aspect of the direct activation account is that the formation of a direct link 
between context and valence presupposes a systematic relation between the valence of 
counterattitudinal experiences and the context in which these experiences were made. If there is 
no such relation, there should be no direct links between context and valence, and therefore no 
effects of the context on evaluative responses. This prediction is different from the one implied 
by the constrained activation account, which suggests that context cues may constrain the 
activation of evaluative information about an object irrespective of whether they are directly 
associated with a particular valence. 
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To test the two competing hypotheses, Gawronski et al. (2014, Experiment 2) used a 
modified version of Rydell and Gawronski’s (2009) paradigm that included evaluative 
information about two individuals rather than one. To avoid any systematic relation between 
context and valence, one of the two targets was described as positive in an initial Context A, 
whereas the other one was described as negative in the same Context A. In a subsequent block, 
the initially positive target was presented with negative information in a second Context B, while 
the initially negative target was presented with positive information in the same Context B. 
Finally, evaluations of the two targets were assessed in the initial Context A, the second Context 
B, and a novel Context C that was not part of the impression formation task. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that context cues are stored in a manner such that they constrain which information is 
activated by the target, evaluative responses were moderated by the presence versus absence of 
the second context despite the absence of any systematic relation between context and valence 
(see Figure 6). That is, evaluations of the two targets reflected the valence of the 
counterattitudinal information about the targets only when the targets were encountered in the 
context in which the counterattitudinal information had been acquired. In contrast, evaluations of 
the targets reflected the valence of the initial attitudinal information when the targets were 
encountered either in the context of the initial attitudinal information or in a novel context that 
had not been part of impression formation task. These results support the idea that context cues 
are stored in a manner such that they constrain which information is activated by the target (see 
Figure 5, left panel), and are inconsistent with the idea of direct links between the mental 
representation of these cues and the valence of the counterattitudinal experience (see Figure 5, 
right panel). According to the latter idea, the absence of a systematic relation between context 
and valence should eliminate contextual renewal effects, which was not the case.   
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Although Gawronski et al.’s (2014) findings support the idea that context cues are stored 
in a manner such that they constrain which information is activated by the target object, 
Gawronski et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis suggests that both mechanisms can contribute to renewal 
effects. Consistent with the idea of direct links between context and valence, effects sizes of both 
ABA and ABC renewal were significantly more pronounced when the study design included a 
systematic relation between context and valence (i.e., when the impression formation task 
included a single target individual) than when there was no such relation (i.e., when the 
impression formation task included two target individuals with opposite valence in the two 
blocks of the task). Yet, effect sizes of both types of renewal effects were still statistically 
significant when there was no systematic relation between context and valence. The finding that 
contextual renewal occurs in the absence of a systematic relation between context and valence 
supports the idea that context cues are stored in a manner such that they constrain which 
information is activated by the target object (see Figure 5, left panel); the finding that contextual 
renewal is more pronounced when there is a systematic relation between context and valence 
supports the idea that the contexts can additionally become associated with the valence of the 
counterattitudinal experience (see Figure 5, right panel). From this perspective, Gawronski et 
al.’s (2015) meta-analytic findings indicate that both mechanisms can jointly contribute to 
contextual renewal effects, although direct links between context and valence do not seem to be 
necessary for their emergence. 
Further evidence against the necessity of direct links between context and valence was 
provided by Gawronski et al. (2014, Experiment 3). A central question of this study was whether 
context cues retain their modulating function when they become associated with an evaluative 
response that is opposite to the one elicited by the target object within that context. For example, 
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if negative experiences were made with a positively evaluated person in the context of a gym, 
will visual cues related to the gym context continue to activate a negative response toward the 
target when the gym context becomes directly associated with a positive response? Persistence in 
contextual modulation after such “counterconditioning” of the relevant context provides further 
evidence that the modulating function of context cues does not depend on direct links between 
context and valence (see De Houwer, Crombez, & Baeyens, 2005). Gawronski et al. addressed 
this question by repeatedly pairing context cues with positive or negative images after 
participants had completed an impression formation task similar to the one by Rydell and 
Gawronski (2009). On the basis of previous research on evaluative conditioning (see De Houwer 
et al., 2001), Gawronski et al. expected that repeated pairings of context cues with positive and 
negative images would influence evaluative responses to these cues in line with the valence of 
the images. More importantly, these newly acquired responses to the contexts were expected to 
leave their modulating function unaffected, such that the contexts should continue to moderate 
the evaluative response that is elicited by the target.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, context cues continued to moderate the evaluative 
response toward a target person even when the context cues became subsequently associated 
with a particular valence by virtue of repeated pairings with positive or negative stimuli. 
Interestingly, the results showed that context cues had two distinct effects on evaluative 
responses when they independently acquired a particular valence (see also Urcelay & Miller, 
2010). First, they continued to moderate the evaluative response that was elicited by the target 
person within that context independent of their conditioned valence (see Figure 7). Second, they 
directly elicited an evaluative response reflecting their conditioned valence independent of the 
evaluative response that was elicited by the target person within that context (see Figure 8). For 
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example, when participants learned positive information about a target in Context A and then 
counterattitudinal negative information about the same target in Context B, they continued to 
show a negative response toward the target in Context B (see Figure 7) even when Context B 
itself elicited a positive response as a result of repeated pairings with positive images (see Figure 
8). Conversely, when participants learned negative information about a target in Context A and 
then counterattitudinal positive information about the same target in Context B, they continued to 
show a positive response toward the target in Context B (see Figure 7) even when Context B 
itself elicited a negative response as a result of repeated pairings with negative images (see 
Figure 8). Using the previous example, if new negative information was learned about an 
initially positively evaluated target in the context of a gym and the gym becomes subsequently 
associated with a positive response, visual cues related to the gym context will have two distinct 
effects when the target is encountered at the gym: (a) they will constrain the activation of 
available information about the target, leading to a negative response toward the target within the 
gym context, and (b) they will directly elicit a positive response despite the negative response 
that is elicited by the target within that context. 
Abstract versus Specific Representation of Evaluative Information 
An interesting question is whether “dual” representations of attitudinal and 
counterattitudinal information involve abstract information about the valence of an object or 
concrete information about specific attributes. This question is closely related to the debate 
between dispositional and constructivist conceptualizations of attitudes (see Gawronski, 2007). 
Dispositional accounts hypothesize that attitudes are stored in the form of abstract summary 
evaluations in long-term memory. According to Fazio (2007), these representations can be 
conceptualized as mental associations between an object and its overall valence. Constructivist 
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accounts reject the notion of enduring dispositional tendencies resulting from abstract 
representations of valence, and instead argue that all evaluative responses are constructed on the 
spot on the basis of momentarily accessible information (Schwarz, 2007).  
Although the debate between the two competing views is notoriously difficult to resolve, 
some of our findings lend support to the idea of abstract attitudinal representations. Using 
Gawronski et al.’s (2014) expectancy-violation paradigm, Brannon, Sacchi, and Gawronski 
(2017) presented participants with 30 behavioral statements about a target individual that were 
displayed one-by-one against different background colors. The initial 20 statements about the 
target were either positive or negative and varied independently on the trait dimensions of 
warmth and competence. That is, participants learned that the target individual was either (a) 
high on warmth, (b) low on warmth, (c) high on competence, or (d) low on competence. The 21st 
statement was used as a target statement and described a behavior suggesting either high warmth, 
low warmth, high competence, or low competence. The valence and dimension of the target 
statement was independent of the valence and dimension of the initial impression statements. 
Thus, the valence of target statement could either be congruent or incongruent with the valence 
of the initial statements, and the dimension of the target statement could either match or 
mismatch the dimension of the initial statements. The target statement was followed by 9 
distracter statements that matched the dimension and valence of the initial 20 statements. 
Participants’ task was to form an impression of the target individual. After the impression 
formation task, participants completed a surprise recognition test, in which they had to identify 
the background color against which the target statement was presented during the impression 
formation task.  
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Expanding on Gawronski et al.’s (2014) finding of a memory advantage for the 
background of expectancy-violating information, Brannon et al. (2017) found an expectancy-
violation effect for behaviors that were incongruent with the valence of prior information, 
regardless of whether the dimension of the target statement matched the dimension of the initial 
statements. For example, when participants formed an initial impression of the target as being 
warm (cold), they showed an expectancy-violation effect when they were presented with new 
information suggesting that the target is incompetent (competent). Conversely, when participants 
formed an initial impression of the target as being competent (incompetent), they showed an 
expectancy-violation effect when they were presented with new information suggesting that the 
target is cold (warm). This pattern replicated across three independent studies with close to 2,000 
total participants. Together, these results suggest that participants’ representation of the target 
captured the abstract valence of the initially acquired information independently of more 
nuanced details about its dimensional content. This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis 
that initial attitudinal information is stored in the form of general positivity versus general 
negativity (Fazio, 2007), but it seems difficult to reconcile with the constructivist argument that 
there are no abstract representations of valence (Schwarz, 2007).  
An open question is whether contextualized representations of counterattitudinal 
information involve abstract representations of valence or concrete representations of specific 
information. Although Brannon et al.’s (2017) findings do not provide an answer to this 
question, their paradigm could be modified to gain deeper insights in this regard. Instead of 
asking participants to identify the background color against which a given statement was 
presented during the impression formation task, participants could be asked to identify the 
statement that was presented against a given background color. By using multiple distracter 
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statements that vary in terms of valence and dimensional content (e.g., warmth vs. competence), 
participants’ responses in the recognition task could be analyzed with advanced modeling 
techniques to quantify participants’ memory for (a) the actual statement, (b) the valence of the 
statement, and (c) the dimensional content of the statement (see Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Data 
along these lines would help to provide deeper insights into whether contextualized 
representations of counterattitudinal information involve abstract representations of valence or 
concrete representations of specific information.  
Pertinent Questions 
Is There Evidence for Valence Asymmetries? 
Another interesting finding of Brannon et al.’s (2017) studies is that there was no 
evidence for valence asymmetries in the violation of expectancies. That is, negative 
counterattitudinal information was as expectancy-violating as positive counterattitudinal 
information. Yet, based on previous evidence for a negativity bias in impression formation (for a 
review, see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), one might expect that negative counterattitudinal 
information should have a greater impact than positive counterattitudinal information, and 
therefore lead to stronger expectancy-violations. A more nuanced prediction could be derived 
from previous research on the perceived diagnosticity of positive and negative information in 
different content domains (see Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). This 
research suggests that negative information related to warmth is perceived as more diagnostic of 
an underlying trait than positive information, whereas positive information related to competence 
is perceived as more diagnostic of an underlying trait than negative information. In line with this 
view, negative information typically receives greater weight in impressions of warmth, whereas 
positive information receives greater weight in impressions of competence. This conclusion 
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suggests that the pattern of valence asymmetries in expectancy-violation may depend on the trait 
dimension. Specifically, new information about a person’s warmth may elicit a stronger 
expectancy-violation when new negative information conflicts with an initial positive impression 
of that person’s warmth than when new positive information conflicts with an initial negative 
impression of that person’s warmth (i.e., negativity bias). Conversely, new information about a 
person’s competence may elicit a stronger expectancy-violation when new positive information 
conflicts with an initial negative impression of that person’s competence than when new negative 
information conflicts with an initial positive impression of that person’s competence (i.e., 
positivity bias).  
Counter to these predictions, Brannon et al. (2017) did not find any evidence for valence 
asymmetries in the violation of expectancies regardless of whether the trait dimension involved 
warmth or competence. This result replicated across three independent studies and in a combined 
analysis that included the data from all three studies. Follow-up research by Brannon and 
Gawronski (2017a) further demonstrated that the lack of valence asymmetries in expectancy-
violation is independent of the strength of the initial expectancy, such that expectancy violation 
effects were equally pronounced regardless of whether participants received large or small 
amounts of initial attitudinal information.   
Consistent with Brannon et al.’s (2017) findings on the violation of expectancies, none of 
our individual studies on contextualized attitude change revealed any evidence for valence 
asymmetries (Gawronski et al., 2010, 2014; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). That is, neither ABA 
nor ABC renewal differed as a function of whether (a) initial positive information was 
challenged by counterattitudinal negative information or (b) initial negative information was 
challenged by counterattitudinal positive information. The only evidence for valence 
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asymmetries comes from Gawronski et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis, which revealed a marginally 
smaller effect size for ABC renewal when initial negative information was challenged by 
counterattitudinal positive information than when initial positive information was challenged by 
counterattitudinal negative information. Because ABC renewal is characterized by a weak 
influence of counterattitudinal information in novel contexts, these meta-analytic findings 
suggest that counterattitudinal positive information tends to be more impactful in influencing 
evaluations in novel contexts than counterattitudinal negative information. There was no 
evidence for valence asymmetries in ABA renewal.  
It is worth noting that all studies in Gawronski et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis involved 
information along the warmth dimension. Therefore, the findings of the meta-analysis suggest a 
valence asymmetry that is opposite to the aforementioned prediction of a negativity bias along 
the warmth dimension. That is, ABC renewal was more pronounced when initial negative 
information along the warmth dimension was challenged by counterattitudinal positive 
information than when initial positive information was challenged by counterattitudinal negative 
information. Drawing on the assumptions of the representational theory, a potential explanation 
for the obtained asymmetry is that negative information captures more attention than positive 
information (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991), which may also enhance attention to its momentary 
context. As a result, context cues may be integrated into the representation of both attitudinal and 
counterattitudinal information when initial negative information is challenged by subsequent 
positive information. According to the representational theory, such differences in attention 
should lead to weaker ABC renewal, but not ABA renewal, when initial negative information is 
challenged by subsequent positive information compared to conditions when initial positive 
information is challenged by subsequent negative information. More research is needed, 
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however, to establish the reliability of the obtained valence asymmetry before exploring its 
underlying mechanisms.   
Which Context Features Determine the Activation of Contextualized Representations? 
The studies reviewed thus far have focused on effects of relatively simple, one-
dimensional visual cues, such as the background color of the computer screen. These findings 
suggest that context cues do not need to have any meaning that is semantically related to the 
content of the counterattitudinal information in order to moderate the activation of this 
information (cf. Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2016). This approach also allowed us to gain 
valuable insights into the processes underlying contextualized attitude change by eliminating 
potential influences of the valence of real-world contexts. Yet, two important questions that still 
need to be addressed are: (a) do context effects resulting from these processes generalize to real-
world contexts with higher levels of complexity, and if so, (b) which features of complex real-
world contexts determine the activation of contextualized representations? For example, if 
counterattitudinal information about an object was learned in the context of a seminar room, does 
only the same seminar room activate the representation of the counterattitudinal information or 
will other contexts that are similar to the seminar room have the same effect? If similar contexts 
can have the same effect, in which particular sense do they have to resemble the context in which 
the counterattitudinal information was learned? Would any seminar room have the same effect 
even if it is perceptually dissimilar to the one in which the counterattitudinal information was 
learned (e.g., a perceptually distinct seminar room in a different building)? Alternatively, would 
a room that is perceptually similar to the seminar room have the same effect even if it is not a 
seminar room (e.g., a dining hall that visually resembles the seminar room)?  
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Gawronski et al. (2014, Experiment 4) addressed these questions by investigating effects 
of real-world contexts that were either perceptually or conceptually similar to the context in 
which counterattitudinal information was learned. Toward this end, participants were presented 
with evaluatively incongruent information about a target individual against two different real-
world backgrounds. Evaluative responses to the target were then measured against (a) the 
background of the initial attitudinal information, (b) the background of the counterattitudinal 
information, (c) a background that was perceptually similar to, but conceptually distinct from, 
the background of the counterattitudinal information, (d) a background that was conceptually 
similar to, but perceptually distinct from, the background of the counterattitudinal information, 
and (e) a background that was both perceptually and conceptually distinct from the background 
of the counterattitudinal information (see Figure 9). The central question was whether 
backgrounds that are either perceptually or conceptually similar to the background of the 
counterattitudinal information elicit evaluative responses in line with the valence of the 
counterattitudinal information.   
The results suggest that contextualized representations of counterattitudinal information 
can be activated by either (a) contexts that are perceptually similar to, but conceptually distinct 
from, the context in which the counterattitudinal information was learned, or (b) contexts that are 
conceptually similar to, but perceptually distinct from, the context in which the counterattitudinal 
information was learned (see Figure 10). Both kinds of contexts produced evaluative responses 
to the target that reflected the valence of the counterattitudinal information. In contrast, contexts 
that were both perceptually and conceptually distinct from the context in which the 
counterattitudinal information had been learned produced a renewal effect, such that evaluative 
responses to the target reflected the valence of the initial attitudinal information (ABC renewal). 
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The same was true for the context of the initial attitudinal information, which elicited evaluative 
responses to the target that were in line with the initial attitudinal information (ABA renewal). 
Taken together, these results indicate that contextualized representations can be activated by 
contexts that are either perceptually or conceptually similar to the context in which the 
counterattitudinal information was acquired.   
Are There Individual Differences? 
Another pertinent question is whether there are individual differences in the tendency to 
form contextualized attitudes. Based on the core assumptions of the representational theory, there 
are a few potential candidates for individual difference effects. A central issue is how people 
respond to conflicting information about an attitude object. For example, individuals with a 
strong preference for consistency might experience a stronger expectancy-violation in response 
to counterattitudinal information compared to individuals with a weak preference for consistency 
(see Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). A similar hypothesis could be derived for individual 
differences in the need for structure, such that individuals with a high need for structure might 
experience a stronger expectancy-violation in response to counterattitudinal information 
compared to individuals with a low for need for structure (see Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). In the 
domain of interpersonal attitudes, one could further argue that individuals with an entity theory 
of personality (i.e., a lay theory that a person’s traits cannot change) might experience a stronger 
expectancy-violation in response to counterattitudinal information about another person 
compared to individuals with an incremental theory of personality (i.e., a lay theory that a 
person’s traits are malleable) (see Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Plaks, in press). Because 
expectancy-violation is assumed to be the driving force behind enhanced attention to context 
during the learning of counterattitudinal information, these considerations suggest that 
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individuals with a weak preference for consistency, a low need for structure, or an incremental 
theory of personality might be less likely to form contextualized representations of 
counterattitudinal information compared to individuals with a strong preference for consistency, 
a high need for structure, or an entity theory of personality, respectively.  
Counter to these hypotheses, a study by Brannon and Gawronski (2017b) did not obtain 
any significant relations between individual differences along the three variables and the 
tendency to show ABA or ABC renewal effects, regardless of whether initial positive 
information was challenged by counterattitudinal negative information, or vice versa. These 
findings replicated in two independent studies with a Canadian and an American sample as well 
as in a combined analysis of the data from both samples (see Table 2). Nevertheless, both studies 
revealed the typical pattern of ABA and ABC renewal. Although it is possible that ABA and 
ABC renewal effects are systematically related to other kinds of individual differences, these 
findings contradict the hypotheses that individual differences in the preference for consistency, 
the need for structure, and lay theories of personality moderate the tendency to show 
contextualized attitude change. 
Are There Cultural Differences? 
Another interesting question concerns the universality of contextualized attitude change 
across cultures. A common assumption in the cross-cultural literature is that individuals from 
Eastern cultures show a greater sensitivity to contextual information than individuals from 
Western cultures. Expanding on this assumption, Ye and Gawronski (in press) discussed two 
alternative predictions regarding cultural differences in contextualized attitude change.  
First, it is possible that individuals from Eastern cultures pay more attention to context 
cues during the learning of initial attitudinal information than individuals from Western cultures 
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(e.g., Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). Hence, individuals from Eastern 
cultures may integrate conflicting information in two contextualized representations, one 
including initial attitudinal information and the other including counterattitudinal information 
(see Gawronski et al., 2010). In contrast, individuals from Western cultures may pay attention to 
context cues only when their expectancies are violated, leading to the formation of context-free 
representations of initial attitudinal information and contextualized representations of 
counterattitudinal information. These assumptions imply that Easterners and Westerners should 
differ specifically in their susceptibility to ABC renewal. That is, evaluations in a novel Context 
C should reflect the valence of initial attitudinal information for individuals from Western 
cultures, but this effect should be reduced for individuals from Eastern cultures. In contrast, 
evaluations in Context A should not differ across cultures, reflecting the valence of initial 
attitudinal information for individuals from both cultures. The same is true for evaluations in 
Context B, which should reflect the valence of counterattitudinal information regardless of 
culture.  
Second, it is possible that individuals from Eastern cultures pay less attention to context 
cues during the learning of counterattitudinal information than individuals from Western 
cultures. A central assumption of Gawronski et al.’s (2010) representational theory is that 
attention to context cues during the learning of counterattitudinal information is enhanced by 
violated expectancies, specifically by the inconsistency between attitudinal and counterattitudinal 
information. A substantial body of research has shown that individuals from Eastern cultures 
tend to have a higher tolerance for inconsistency than individuals from Westerner cultures 
(Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010). This difference has been attributed to cultural 
differences in reasoning styles, in that dialectical thinking tends to be more prevalent among 
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Easterners, whereas analytical thinking tends to be more prevalent in among Westerners (Choi & 
Nisbett, 2000; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). A fundamental difference between the two thinking styles 
is that an object can have a particular attribute as well as the opposite attribute from a dialectical 
point of view, which would be inconsistent from an analytic perspective.  
Applied to the current question, these findings suggest that individuals from Eastern 
cultures may pay less attention to context during the learning of counterattitudinal information 
than individuals from Western cultures. Thus, individuals from Eastern cultures may integrate 
conflicting information in a single context-free representation that includes both attitudinal and 
counterattitudinal information. In contrast, individuals from Western cultures may experience a 
strong expectancy-violation in response to counterattitudinal information, which should increase 
attention to context. As a result, individuals from Western cultures should form context-free 
representations of initial attitudinal information and contextualized representations of 
counterattitudinal information. Together, these assumptions suggest ABA and ABC renewal 
should occur for participants from Western cultures, but not for participants from Eastern 
cultures. This hypothesis implies the counterintuitive yet interesting prediction that evaluative 
responses of Eastern participants should be less sensitive to contextual influences than evaluative 
responses of Western participants. Whereas evaluative responses of Western participants should 
reflect the valence of counterattitudinal information in the context in which this information had 
been learned and the valence of initial attitudinal information in any other context, evaluative 
responses of Eastern participants may reflect a mixture of the available information regardless of 
the context.  
Although Gawronski et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis provides preliminary evidence for the 
second hypothesis (i.e., eliminated ABA and ABC renewal in Eastern cultures), a reanalysis of 
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the available data by Ye, Tong, Chiu, and Gawronski (2017) suggests that the effects sizes for 
ABA and ABC renewal in Eastern samples were suppressed by the inclusion of data obtained 
with a measure that is known for its low reliability (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).2 When 
these data were excluded, a combined analysis of all available studies with participants from 
Eastern cultures (including a new study that was conducted after the publication of the meta-
analysis) revealed significant effects for both ABA and ABC renewal (Ye et al., 2017). Thus, 
counter to the two competing predictions regarding cross-cultural differences in contextual 
renewal (see Ye & Gawronski, in press), the currently available evidence suggests that 
contextualized attitude change occurs in both Western and Eastern cultures. Using Gawronski et 
al.’s (2014) expectancy-violation paradigm, a follow-up study by Ye et al. (2017) provided 
further evidence for this conclusion, showing that individuals from Eastern and Western cultures 
show the same expectancy-violation effect in response to counterattitudinal information (see 
Figure 11). 
Theoretical Challenges 
Although there is considerable evidence supporting the predictions of the representational 
theory of contextualized attitude change, there are a few findings that pose a challenge to the 
theory. One example concerns the types of information that lead to context-independent changes 
in spontaneous evaluations. Counter to the widespread assumption that spontaneous evaluations 
are highly robust and difficult to change (e.g., Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & 
Hugenberg, 2007), two recent sets of studies suggest that spontaneous evaluations can change 
                                                 
2 The critical measure was the evaluative priming task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), which rarely 
shows Cronbach’s α values higher than .50 (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). Low reliability can undermine the 
detection of actually existing effects by reducing statistical power through large proportions of measurement error 
(LeBel & Paunonen, 2011). 
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rapidly in response to a single piece of information (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Mann & Ferguson, 
2015; for a review, see Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, in press). From the perspective of the 
representational theory, these findings raise the question of whether such changes generalize 
across contexts or instead are limited to the context in which the new information was learned. 
First, Mann and Ferguson (2015) found that new information suggesting a 
reinterpretation of prior information led to rapid changes in spontaneous evaluations. In a series 
of studies, participants formed a negative impression of a target individual by reading a story that 
depicted the individual performing various negative actions (e.g., breaking into a house and 
taking precious things from the bedroom). After forming the impression, participants received 
additional information that suggested a positive interpretation of the target’s negative actions 
(e.g., the individual broke into the house to save the family’s kids from a fire). Counter to the 
hypothesis that changes in spontaneous evaluations require large amounts of counterattitudinal 
information (e.g., Rydell et al., 2007), participants showed a rapid revision of their spontaneous 
evaluations in response to the new information suggesting a reinterpretation of the initial 
attitudinal information. A follow-up study showed that such reinterpretations can reverse the 
effect of previously acquired attitudinal information even when there is a delay of several days 
between the learning of the initial attitudinal information and the information suggesting a 
reinterpretation (Mann & Ferguson, 2017). 
Another set of experiments by Cone and Ferguson (2015) demonstrated the effectiveness 
of extreme “diagnostic” information in rapidly changing spontaneous evaluations. In their 
studies, participants formed an impression of a target individual via large amounts of positive 
information and then received one piece of either highly diagnostic negative information or 
neutral information. Again, counter to the hypothesis that changes in spontaneous evaluations 
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require large amounts of counterattitudinal information (e.g., Rydell et al., 2007), participants 
who received a single piece of diagnostic negative information showed a rapid revision of their 
spontaneous evaluations in response to the diagnostic negative information.  
Expanding on the representational theory of contextualized attitude change, Brannon and 
Gawronski (2017c) investigated whether the two cases of rapid updating reflect context-
dependent or context-independent changes in spontaneous evaluations. Drawing on the 
hypothesis that context-dependent change results from enhanced attention to the context during 
the encoding of expectancy-violating information, Brannon and Gawronski predicted that 
reinterpretation of earlier information should lead to context-independent changes in spontaneous 
evaluations. In contrast, diagnostic counterattitudinal information was predicted to produce 
context-dependent changes in spontaneous evaluations.  
The first prediction was derived from the idea that information that sheds new light on 
old information simply provides additional cues regarding the meaning of the old information, 
which does not involve any kind of expectancy-violation. In such cases, the new information 
may not violate any expectancies, because it does not directly contradict the initial information. 
Because expectancy-violation is assumed to be a central determinant of attention to context 
(Gawronski et al., 2010), the new information should simply lead to a reinterpretation of the old 
information instead of being stored in a contextualized representation. As a result, it should lead 
to changes in spontaneous evaluations that generalize across contexts.  
The second prediction was derived from the idea that diagnostic information that directly 
conflicts with initially acquired attitudinal information should violate perceivers’ expectancies, 
and thereby enhance attention to the context during the learning of the counterattitudinal 
CONTEXTUALIZED ATTITUDE CHANGE  39 
information. As a result, diagnostic counterattitudinal information should be stored in a 
contextualized representation, leading to context-dependent changes in spontaneous evaluations.  
To test these predictions, Brannon and Gawronski (2017c) conducted two experiments 
that adapted the paradigms by Mann and Ferguson (2015) and Cone and Ferguson (2015) and 
combined them with the contextualized-change paradigm by Rydell and Gawronski (2009). 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, their results showed that a single piece of information that 
shed a positive light on prior negative information led to context-independent changes in 
spontaneous evaluations (see Figure 12). Counter to the second hypothesis, however, a single 
piece of diagnostic counterattitudinal information also resulted in context-independent changes 
in spontaneous evaluations (see Figure 13). Because diagnostic counterattitudinal information 
should violate attitude-related expectancies, and thereby enhance attention to the context during 
the learning of the counterattitudinal information, the latter finding poses a challenge to the 
predictions derived from the representational theory.  
There are at least two potential explanations for this discrepancy. First, it is possible that 
extreme counterattitudinal information is capturing attention to an extent that it directs attention 
away from the context.3 In this case, the relation between expectancy-violation and contextual 
renewal may be curvilinear rather than linear. That is, for low to moderate levels of expectancy-
violation, attention to context may continuously increase, leading to a parallel increase in 
contextual renewal effects. In contrast, for moderate to high levels of expectancy-violation, more 
attention may be devoted to the expectancy-violating information at the expense of attention to 
context, leading to a decrease in contextual renewal effects. From this perspective, contextual 
                                                 
3 We thank Nicholas Patton for this idea.  
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renewal effects may be strongest for moderate levels of expectancy-violation, and weaker for 
low and high levels of expectancy-violation (i.e., inverse U-shaped function). We are currently 
conducting a study designed to test this hypothesis.  
A second potential explanation is that, in the domain of impression formation, extreme 
negative behavior is deemed indicative of core personality characteristics, resulting in 
dispositional attributions that generalize across contexts (Fiske, 1980; Reeder, 1993). This may 
be especially the case within the domain of (im)moral behavior (see Reeder & Brewer, 1979; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Hence, when confronted with expectancy-violating behavior of 
extreme negative valence, perceivers may engage in dispositional attributions that fully override 
the effects of enhanced attention to the context. From this perspective, Brannon and Gawronski’s 
(2017c) results may not necessarily disprove the core assumptions of the representational theory. 
Instead, they may suggest an important boundary condition that has to be reconciled with the 
original theory by means of an additional assumption: effects of enhanced attention to context 
can be overridden by dispositional attributions.  
This conclusion also suggests a different interpretation of Gawronski et al.’s (2010) 
finding that exposure to counterattitudinal information in multiple different contexts eliminates 
both ABA and ABC renewal (see Figure 4). We initially interpreted this finding in terms of 
attention to context during the learning of counterattitudinal information. Our central assumption 
was that counterattitudinal information in multiple different contexts signals that the newly 
acquired information generalizes across contexts, which was assumed to reduce attention to 
context. Yet, this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with Gawronski et al.’s (2014) finding 
that even a single piece of expectancy-violating information was sufficient to enhance attention 
to context (see Figure 2). Hence, although attention to context may decline with increasing 
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amounts of counterattitudinal information when counterattitudinal information is learned in 
multiple contexts, the very first piece of counterattitudinal information should still be stored in a 
contextualized representation. Based on the findings by Brannon and Gawronski (2017c), a more 
plausible explanation is that counterattitudinal information in multiple contexts leads to 
dispositional attributions that fully override the effects of enhanced attention to context. That is, 
people may infer a context-independent disposition when counterattitudinal information is 
learned in multiple different contexts, and such dispositional attributions may counteract the 
influence of enhanced attention to context during the learning of the first piece of 
counterattitudinal information. Thus, although evidence for AAB renewal suggests that causal 
attributions to situational factors may not be necessary for contextualized attitude change, causal 
attributions to dispositional factors may have the potential to fully override the effects of 
enhanced attention to context during the learning of counterattitudinal information.  
Although causal attribution to dispositional factors provides an integrative explanation 
for context-independent effects of counterattitudinal information that is either (a) highly 
diagnostic or (b) encountered in multiple different contexts, any such explanation additionally 
has to assume a retroactive interference with the integration of the context into the representation 
of the counterattitudinal information. In both cases, dispositional attribution would have to 
counteract the immediate effects of enhanced attention to context during exposure to expectancy-
violating counterattitudinal information (see Brannon et al., 2017; Gawronski et al., 2014). One 
important factor in this regard might be the consolidation of a newly formed contextualized 
representation. That is, dispositional attribution may effectively prevent the integration of 
context cues into the representation of counterattitudinal information if this representation did 
not have a chance to consolidate. To the extent that a newly formed contextualized 
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representation had a chance to consolidate, however, dispositional attribution may be ineffective 
in retroactively erasing the context from the existing representation. This hypothesis has 
important implications for the effects of counterattitudinal information in multiple different 
contexts, because it suggests a boundary condition for the obtained elimination of contextual 
renewal effects (Gawronski et al., 2010). That is, to the extent that a newly formed 
contextualized representation had a chance to consolidate, delayed learning of additional 
counterattitudinal information in other contexts may be ineffective in eliminating ABA and ABC 
renewal. Future research testing this hypothesis would help to provide deeper insights into the 
potential role of attributional processes and memory consolidation in the elimination of 
contextual renewal effects. 
Another challenge to the representational theory is an unexpected finding of Gawronski et 
al.’s (2015) meta-analysis, suggesting that enhanced attention to context during initial attitudinal 
learning does not reduce the average effect size for ABC renewal. If anything, the average effect 
size for ABC renewal was greater when attention to context during the learning of initial 
attitudinal information was enhanced. This finding stands in contrast to the predictions of the 
representational theory, which implies that enhanced attention to context during initial attitudinal 
learning should reduce ABC renewal. Although it is possible that the lack of a difference in the 
obtained effect sizes of ABC renewal is due to procedural confounds between different studies in 
the meta-analysis, it poses a major challenge to the predictions of the representational theory. 
Future research is needed to further investigate the hypothesized role of attention to context 
during initial attitudinal learning.    
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Future Directions 
Spontaneous versus Deliberate Evaluations 
To investigate contextualized changes in attitudes, all of the reviewed studies relied on 
measures of spontaneous evaluations. For example, a substantial proportion of our work (e.g., 
Brannon & Gawronski, 2017c; Gawronski et al., 2010; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009; Ye et al., 
2017) has used the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005), which capitalizes 
on the notion of sequential priming to measure unintentional responses to a prime stimulus by 
assessing its effects on judgments of a neutral target stimulus. In our studies on contextualized 
attitude change, participants were briefly presented with images of the impression target against 
(a) the background of initial attitudinal information, (b) the background of the counterattitudinal 
information, or (c) a novel background that was not presented during the impression formation 
task. Following the presentation of the impression target, participants were briefly presented with 
a neutral target stimulus (e.g., Chinese ideograph, polygon), which was replaced by a black-and-
white pattern mask. Participants’ task was to indicate whether they found the neutral target 
stimulus visually more pleasant or visually less pleasant than average. The modal finding in the 
AMP is that participants judge the neutral targets more favorably when they were primed with a 
positive stimulus than when they were primed with a negative stimulus (for a review, see Payne 
& Lundberg, 2014). Based on evidence that the primes influence participants’ judgments of the 
targets despite their intention not to be influenced by the primes (e.g., Payne et al., 2005), 
evaluative responses measured by the AMP can be described as unintentional.  
Although the dominant use of the AMP in our work may suggest that ABA and ABC 
renewal may be limited to unintentional evaluations, we have also conducted several studies that 
investigated the two kinds of renewal effects on measures of intentional evaluation (e.g., 
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Gawronski et al., 2014). In these studies, participants were briefly presented with images of the 
impression target against (a) the background of initial attitudinal information, (b) the background 
of the counterattitudinal information, or (c) a novel background that was not presented during the 
impression formation task. Following the presentation of the impression target, participants had 
to make a forced-choice judgment by indicating whether their immediate “gut” response to the 
presented stimulus was positive or negative. These judgments had to be made under time 
pressure, such that participants were asked to provide their response within 1000 ms after the 
onset of the impression target. Because participants’ responses in this speeded evaluation task 
involved a goal to evaluate the impression target, the measured evaluations can be described as 
intentional. Yet, they were still spontaneous in the sense that participants were prevented from 
deliberating about the presented stimulus or their evaluative response.  These measures 
replicated the patterns obtained on the AMP. 
The dominant focus on spontaneous evaluations raises the question of whether the 
reviewed patterns of contextualized attitude change generalize to deliberate evaluations in which 
participants have ample time to think about the target object. Gawronski and Cesario (2013) 
proposed that the context cues in ABA and ABC renewal function as retrieval cues, in that they 
influence which information comes to mind most rapidly upon encountering a target object. 
From this perspective, the reviewed patterns of contextualized change may be most pronounced 
for immediate evaluative responses to the target object. With increasing delays, deliberate 
processing may involve the retrieval of other target-related information, including information 
that was learned in other contexts (see Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; 
Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, & Spivey, 2009). In this case, the conflicting pieces of information 
may give raise to a state of ambivalence, which may be reflected in people’s deliberate 
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evaluative judgments. Alternatively, people may use their contextual knowledge to disambiguate 
the valence of the target. In this case, deliberate evaluations may be guided by counterattitudinal 
information when the target is encountered in the context in which this information was learned.  
It is less clear how people would resolve the resulting conflict for deliberate evaluations 
in Context A and Context C for which there is no contextual information stored in memory. 
Drawing on research on ease-of-retrieval effects (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-
Schatka, & Simons, 1991), one possibility is that people attribute higher validity to information 
that comes to mind easily and discount the validity of information that requires cognitive effort 
to be retrieved from memory (Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002). In this case, deliberate 
evaluations in Contexts A and C may be determined by the initial attitudinal information. 
Alternatively, it is possible that less accessible information is given equal weight in an integrated 
judgment that combines all available information regardless of how rapidly it comes to mind. In 
this case, the patterns obtained for spontaneous evaluations may not necessarily generalize to 
deliberate evaluations, which may instead reflect a state of ambivalence. Although the 
correspondence between spontaneous and deliberate evaluations can be moderated by a variety 
of other factors (for a review, see Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005), future 
research may help to clarify the commonalities and differences between spontaneous and 
deliberate evaluations in their susceptibility to ABA and ABC renewal.4 
                                                 
4 Gawronski et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis includes data from an AMP variant that used a longer delay between the 
presentation of the primes and the targets. The average effect sizes for ABA and ABC renewal revealed by this 
measure were non-significant and close to zero. Yet, counter to the conclusion that longer processing times reduce 
the two kinds of renewal effects, Klein and Ratliff (2014) found significant effects of ABA and ABC renewal when 
participants had unlimited time to provide their evaluative judgments of the target in different contexts.  
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Associative versus Propositional Learning 
According to the representational theory, violation of attitude-related expectancies 
represents a crucial determinant of contextualized attitude change. Specifically, expectancy-
violations are assumed to enhance attention to context, which leads to an integration of the 
context into the representation of expectancy-violating counterattitudinal information. Yet, 
different from the proposed role of conscious expectancies, some theories suggest that mere co-
occurrences between a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) and a positive or negative 
unconditioned stimulus (US) can influence evaluative representations via a process of automatic 
link formation in the absence of conscious expectancies about their co-occurrence (e.g., 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Whereas the formation of 
conscious beliefs about states of affairs has been described as propositional learning, the 
formation of associative links on the basis of mere co-occurrences has been described as 
associative learning (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Although some researchers (including 
authors of this article) have rejected the idea of associative learning via automatic link formation, 
arguing that all forms of learning in humans are mediated by propositional processes (e.g., De 
Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), it is an interesting question whether 
mere co-occurrences between a CS and a US produce the same patterns of contextualized 
attitude change. Preliminary findings from our lab suggest that ABA and ABC renewal effects 
do not occur for repeated CS-US pairings involving neutral images as CSs and pleasant and 
unpleasant images as USs. In these studies, counterattitudinal pairings effectively reversed the 
effects of initial attitudinal pairings regardless of the context. However, more evidence is needed 
to address potential confounds in these studies and to rule out alternative interpretations of the 
obtained discrepancies. 
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From Social to Non-social Objects 
Another important issue for future research concerns the generalizability of our findings 
to non-social objects. In the reviewed studies, we primarily focused on social attitudes toward 
other people. It seems reasonable to assume that the identified principles generalize to non-social 
objects (e.g., consumer products). To the extent that counterattitudinal experiences with non-
social objects can violate attitudinal expectancies about these objects, the content of the 
counterattitudinal experience should be stored in a contextualized representation, thereby leading 
to the same patterns of contextualized attitude change. Preliminary evidence for this assumption 
comes from clinical research on ABA and ABC renewal in the extinction and return of 
conditioned fear responses (for a review, see Vervliet, Craske, & Hermans, 2013). In line with 
our findings in the area of social attitudes, a considerable body of evidence suggests that 
extinction of a conditioned fear response is often limited to the context in which extinction 
occurred, in that the initial fear response returns in the initial conditioning context (ABA 
renewal) or a novel context in which the fear-eliciting stimulus had not been encountered before 
(ABC renewal). Similar parallels have been found for the moderators of ABA and ABC renewal. 
For example, in line with Gawronski et al.’s (2010) finding that both ABA and ABC renewal 
effects are eliminated when counterattitudinal information is learned in multiple different 
contexts, several clinical studies have shown that exposure treatment in multiple contexts 
attenuates the contextual renewal of fear responses after extinction (e.g., Gunther, Denniston, & 
Miller, 1998; Vansteenwegen, Vervliet, Iberico, Baeyens, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2007; but 
see Bouton, García-Gutiérrez, Zilski, & Moody, 2006). Despite these overlaps in empirical 
findings, more research is needed to investigate whether the principles identified for social 
objects generalize to non-social objects.   
CONTEXTUALIZED ATTITUDE CHANGE  48 
Implications 
The reviewed evidence for ABA and ABC renewal effects has important implications for 
the effectiveness of attitude change manipulations in social psychology. A common question in 
research on attitudes is whether experimentally induced changes in attitudes reflect enduring 
long-term changes or ephemeral shifts that may dissipate over time (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
To address this question, participants are often brought back into the lab several days or weeks 
after the experimental manipulation. To the extent that the initially observed change remains 
stable over time, it is assumed that the employed manipulation was effective in producing 
enduring long-term change (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012; Hu, 
Antony, Creery, Vargas, Bodenhausen & Paller, 2015; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & 
Russin, 2000; Olson & Fazio, 2006; Petty, 1977). However, the notion of contextualized attitude 
change suggests that, although the observed changes may be stable over time within the same 
context, they may not generalize to other contexts. After all, it is possible that effective attitude 
change in the lab does not generalize to other contexts outside of the lab even when the observed 
change in the lab is stable over time. Thus, to establish the effectiveness of experimental 
manipulations in producing enduring attitude change that generalizes across contexts, it is 
important to include not only delayed follow-up measurements, but also measurements in 
contexts that are different from the one in which the manipulation took place. These 
considerations seem particularly important for interventions designed to combat undesired or 
dysfunctional attitudes (e.g., prejudice).  
At a broader level, this conclusion resonates with Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) notion of 
IF-THEN conditionals reflecting idiosyncratic situation-behavior profiles, which implies that 
individuals may show behavioral consistency over time within a particular context, even if 
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behavioral consistency across contexts is low. From this perspective, a person may show 
inconsistent evaluations of the same object if the object is encountered in different contexts. This 
inconsistency across contexts does not imply, however, that the person’s evaluations of the 
object are inconsistent over time. After all, evaluations of a given object may be highly 
consistent over time if they are measured within the same context.  
Expanding on these ideas, the notion of contextual renewal offers specific predictions 
about the conditions under which evaluations should be consistent or inconsistent across contexts 
(see Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). First, if initial attitudinal information about an object is 
learned in Context A and then challenged by counterattitudinal information in Context B, 
evaluations of the object in Context A and Context B should be inconsistent. Whereas 
evaluations in Context A should reflect the initial attitudinal information, evaluations in Context 
B should reflect the counterattitudinal information. Second, if initial attitudinal information 
about an object is learned in Context A and then challenged by counterattitudinal information in 
another Context B, evaluations of the object in Context B and a novel Context C should also be 
inconsistent. Whereas evaluations in Context B should reflect the counterattitudinal information, 
evaluations in Context C should reflect the initial attitudinal information. Third, if initial 
attitudinal information about an object is learned in Context A and then challenged by 
counterattitudinal information in Context B, evaluations of the object in Context A and a novel 
Context C should be consistent. In this case, evaluations should reflect the initial attitudinal 
information regardless of whether the object is encountered in Context A or Context C. Finally, 
if initial attitudinal information about an object is learned in Context A and then challenged by 
counterattitudinal information in the same Context A, evaluations of the object in Context A and 
a novel Context B should be inconsistent. Whereas evaluations in Context A should reflect the 
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counterattitudinal information, evaluations in the novel Context B should reflect the initial 
attitudinal information.5 According to the representation theory of contextualized attitude 
change, these predictions should hold unless attention to context is enhanced during the learning 
of initial attitudinal information or attention to context is reduced during the learning of 
counterattitudinal information. 
Our social-psychological research program on contextualized attitude change also 
highlights interesting connections to other psychological disciplines. We already mentioned 
several parallels between our work on social attitudes and clinical research on renewal effects in 
the treatment of affective disorders (for reviews, see Vervliet, Baeyens, et al., 2013; Vervliet, 
Craske, et al., 2013). Similar parallels can be found to research on renewal effects in animal 
learning (for reviews, see Bouton, 2010; Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). The reviewed work on 
social attitudes provides valuable insights for these two lines of research by offering an 
integrative theoretical framework that relies on relatively basic, well-established principles in the 
processing of social information (e.g., enhanced attention to context in response to expectancy-
violations). In addition, the current focus on attitudes and evaluation complements previous work 
on contextual renewal of fear responses, which has almost exclusively focused on physiological 
responses (see Dirikx, Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2004). Conversely, 
previous work on renewal effects in animal learning can offer valuable insights for social-
psychological work on attitudes through a rich body of evidence for boundary conditions and 
conceptually related phenomena. Finally, the rapidly growing body of work on renewal effects in 
the clinical domain highlights the broader real-world relevance of the general principles 
                                                 
5 A potential qualification of this hypothesis is implied by evidence for spontaneous recovery, which suggests that 
delayed testing in Context A may yield evaluations that reflect the valence of the initial attitudinal information (for a 
review, see Rescorla, 2004).   
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identified by social-psychological work on attitudes. Thus, research on contextualized attitude 
change may function as a hub for enhanced cross-talk between areas, and thereby facilitate 
scientific progress through the unique contributions made by each area of inquiry.  
Conclusion 
The main goal of the current chapter was to review the findings of an ongoing research 
program on contextualized attitude change, suggesting that changes in attitudes can be limited to 
the context in which counterattitudinal information had been acquired. The reviewed findings 
suggest that, although counterattitudinal information may effectively influence evaluations in the 
context in which this information was learned, previously formed attitudes may continue to 
influence evaluations in any other context. According to the representational theory of 
contextualized attitude change, these effects occur because exposure to expectancy-violating 
information enhances attention to context, which leads to an integration of the context into the 
representation of expectancy-violating counterattitudinal information. As a result, 
counterattitudinal information influences evaluations only in the context in which this 
information was learned, whereas initial attitudinal information continues to influence 
evaluations in any other context. Although social-psychological research on contextualized 
attitude change is still in its infancy, the observation of corresponding patterns in other sub-
disciplines corroborates the significance of context for understanding attitude change. 
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Table 1. Different kinds of renewal effects in the learning of attitudinal and counterattitudinal 
information.  
Effect Description 
ABA Renewal Learning of initial attitudinal information in Context A 
Learning of counterattitudinal information in Context B 
Initial attitudinal information influences evaluations in Context A 
ABC Renewal Learning of initial attitudinal information in Context A 
Learning of counterattitudinal information in Context B 
Initial attitudinal information influences evaluations in Context C 
AAB Renewal Learning of initial attitudinal information in Context A 
Learning of counterattitudinal information in Context A 
Initial attitudinal information influences evaluations in Context B 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations to individual difference variables for ABA and ABC renewal effects as a 
function of valence-order (positive-negative, negative-positive). 
 Renewal Effect Preference for 
Consistency 
Personal Need for 
Structure 
Lay Theory of 
Personality 
 M SD r r r 
ABA Renewal      
positive-negative 0.073 0.312 .02 ns .02 ns -.08 ns 
negative-positive 0.117 0.320 .07 ns .04 ns .07 ns 
ABC Renewal      
positive-negative 0.056 0.314 .09 ns .03 ns -.09 ns 
negative-positive 0.048 0.276 -.06 ns .00 ns .01 ns 
Note. Higher scores on the individual difference measures indicate a stronger preference for consistency, a higher need for structure, 
and a stronger endorsement of an entity versus incremental theory of personality, respectively (N = 270).  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Evaluative responses toward target person as a function of context during the 
measurement of evaluative responses (context of first learning block vs. context of second 
learning block vs. novel context) and time (after first learning block vs. after second learning 
block). The upper panel depicts evaluations when participants learned positive information in the 
first learning block and negative information in the second learning block (Rydell & Gawronski, 
2009, Experiment 3); the lower panel depicts evaluations when participants learned negative 
information in the first learning block and positive information in the second learning block 
(Rydell & Gawronski, 2009, Experiment 4). Error bars depict standard errors. Figures adapted 
from Rydell and Gawronski (2009); reprinted with permission. 
Figure 2. Proportions of correct memory for the context (background color) of a target 
statement as a function of valence of initial information (positive vs. negative) and valence of 
target statement (positive vs. negative). The dotted line depicts chance-level performance of 10% 
correct memory judgments. The upper panel shows the results of Gawronski et al. (2014, 
Experiment 1a); the lower panel shows the results of Gawronski et al. (2014, Experiment 1b). 
Figures adapted from Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, and De Houwer (2014); reprinted with permission. 
Figure 3. Evaluative responses toward target person as a function of valence order in 
impression formation (positive-negative vs. negative-positive), priming of context salience 
before the first learning episode (low salience vs. high salience), and context during the 
measurement of evaluative responses (first context vs. second context vs. novel context). Error 
bars depict standard errors. Figure adapted from Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, and De Houwer 
(2010); reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 4. Evaluative responses toward target person as a function of valence order in 
impression formation (positive-negative vs. negative-positive), number of contexts in the second 
learning block (single context vs. multiple contexts), and context during the measurement of 
evaluative responses (first context vs. second context vs. novel context). Error bars depict 
standard errors. Figure adapted from Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, and De Houwer (2010); 
reprinted with permission. 
Figure 5. Two associative network models to explain contextual renewal effects on 
evaluative responses. Arrows indicate excitatory associations; blocked lines indicate inhibitory 
associations; open circles indicate memory nodes or representations. In the network model on the 
left, context leads to renewal effects by constraining the activation of valence in response to the 
target object. In the network model on the right, context leads to renewal effects by directly 
activating valence over and above the activation of valence by the target object. The network 
model on the left was adapted from a figure in Bouton (1994); reprinted with permission. 
Figure 6. Evaluative responses toward target individuals as a function of valence order in 
impression formation (positive-negative vs. negative-positive) and context during the 
measurement of evaluative responses (first context vs. second context vs. third context). Error 
bars depict standard errors. Figure adapted from Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, and De Houwer (2014); 
reprinted with permission. 
Figure 7. Evaluative responses toward target individuals as a function of valence order in 
impression formation task (positive-negative vs. negative-positive), context during the 
measurement of evaluative responses (first context vs. second context), and time of measurement 
(before context conditioning vs. after context conditioning). Error bars depict standard errors. 
Figure adapted from Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, and De Houwer (2014); reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 8. Evaluative responses as a function of context conditioning (first-positive, 
second-negative vs. first-negative, second-positive), context during the measurement of 
evaluative responses (first context vs. second context), and time of measurement (before context 
conditioning vs. after context conditioning). Error bars depict standard errors. Figure adapted 
from Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, and De Houwer (2014); reprinted with permission. 
Figure 9. Images used to manipulate perceptual versus conceptual similarity between 
contexts. Images shown in the same row are perceptually similar but conceptually distinct; 
images in the same column are conceptually similar but perceptually distinct; images displayed 
diagonally are both perceptually and conceptually distinct. Figure adapted from Gawronski, Ye, 
Rydell, and De Houwer (2014); reprinted with permission. 
Figure 10. Evaluative responses toward target person as a function of valence order in 
impression formation (positive-negative vs. negative-positive) and context during the 
measurement of evaluative responses (first context vs. second context vs. perceptually similar to 
second context vs. conceptually similar to second context vs. distinct from second context). Error 
bars depict standard errors. Figure adapted from Gawronski, Ye, Rydell, and De Houwer (2014); 
reprinted with permission. 
Figure 11. Proportion of correct memory for the context (background color) of a target 
statement as a function of target statement (expectancy-congruent vs. expectancy-incongruent) 
and country (Canada vs. Singapore). The dotted line depicts chance-level performance of 10% 
correct memory judgments. Error bars depict standard errors. Figure adapted from Ye, Tong, 
Chiu, and Gawronski (2017); reprinted with permission. 
Figure 12. Evaluative responses toward target person as a function of new information 
(supportive vs. reinterpretation), measurement time (Time 1 vs. Time 2), and measurement 
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context (first learning context vs. second learning context vs. novel context). Error bars depict 
standard errors. Figure adapted from Brannon and Gawronski (2017c); reprinted with 
permission. 
Figure 13. Evaluative responses toward target person as a function of new information 
(diagnostic vs. neutral), measurement time (Time 1 vs. Time 2), and measurement context (first 
learning context vs. second learning context vs. novel context). Error bars depict standard errors. 
Figure adapted from Brannon and Gawronski (2017c); reprinted with permission. 
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